天美影院

Title of measure	Broadening the investment opportunities of DC schemes 鈥� disclose and explain
Lead Department/Agency	Department for Work and Pensions
Planned coming into force /implementation date	TBC
Origin (Domestic/EU/Regulator)	Domestic
Policy lead	Megan Lacey
Lead analyst	Rebecca McCaw, Lucas Richardson
Departmental Assessment	Self-certified
Total Net Present Social Value (over 10year period): -拢12.6m	Business Impact Status: Non-Qualifying Regulatory Provision
Equivalent Annual Net Direct Cost to Business (EANDCB)(over 10 year period):拢1.5m	Business Impact Status: Non-Qualifying Regulatory Provision

Summary - Intervention and impacts

Policy Background and Issue

Following HMT鈥檚 Patient Capital Review of November 2017^{[footnote 1]}, the Government has been keen to find ways to facilitate greater diversification in investment by UK institutional investors, particularly pension schemes. DWP consulted in February 2019^{[footnote 2]} and March 2022^{[footnote 3]} on proposals to facilitate investment by defined contribution (DC) schemes in less liquid assets.

DWP is now moving forward with proposals for relevant schemes with 100+ members to report their policies on illiquid investment in their Default Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) and to publicly disclose their default asset allocations in their annual Chair鈥檚 Statement. We propose Collective Money Purchase schemes (CMP) schemes report their policies on illiquid investment in the main SIP, as they don鈥檛 produce a Default SIP.

In the last few years, there has been a noticeable increase in DC schemes鈥� appetite^{[footnote 4]} to consider the benefits that come from a more diversified investment strategy. However, the Government believes that more can be done to demonstrate to trustees that illiquid assets are an important part of this diversification and should be seriously considered, as they could potentially provide members with higher net returns^{[footnote 5]}.

Rationale for Intervention

Pension savers often have limited access to important information on their retirement savings, such as where their money is being invested. If they wish to obtain information about asset allocations and policies on investment in illiquid assets, they may be required to request this information from their provider, leading to an asymmetric information market failure and lack of transparency in the market.

Employees are enrolled in pension schemes by their employers. This creates a principal agent problem within the market, as there is uncertainty that employees will be enrolled in a scheme that aligns with their best interests. The disclosure of schemes鈥� illiquid policies and asset allocations will improve the availability of information to members and employers and provide them with certainty that trustees are giving proper consideration to the full range of investment opportunities on offer, fulfilling trustees鈥� fiduciary duty requirements to create an investment approach that aligns with members鈥� best interests.

Government intervention is necessary as currently we estimate that only 4 percent of the schemes in scope for asset allocation disclosures currently report this data in the proposed standardised format voluntarily^{[footnote 6]}, emphasising the lack of comparable and consistent information available to most members and employers, which will likely continue if the government chooses not to intervene.

Intended Effects

The intended effect is to encourage greater competition, transparency, accountability and innovation based on overall value for money in the DC market. If the disclosure of asset allocations and illiquid investment policies becomes a standardised disclosure across industry, members, employers and investment consultants could compare this information between providers as part of a holistic assessment for value for money. This could benefit members of pension schemes in scope through further portfolio diversification, reducing risk of concentration in a narrow range of asset classes and targeting investment opportunities that could potentially bring members higher returns.

Brief description of viable policy options considered (including alternatives to regulation)

Policy Option 0: Do nothing.

Currently, we estimate at least 4 percent of schemes in scope for asset allocation disclosures voluntarily report some of this data^{[footnote 7]}. As disclosure is not currently uniform, it is difficult for employers to compare offerings across schemes, and for members to compare across the various pots that they may hold.

By doing nothing, trustees may not be having the conversations needed to fully consider all investment opportunities available or understand the benefits and value that illiquid assets could bring to their portfolios. There will continue to be a lack of information available to most members and employers. Where trustees are having these conversations already, they may not be making their members or employers aware of them. Allowing this to continue would mean that only the employers and members in the minority of schemes that do publish this information may be aware of it.

Policy Option 1: Amend the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations and introduce new asset allocation disclosure regulations 鈥� Preferred Option

This option involves requiring all qualifying DC and CMP schemes to disclose and explain their policies on illiquid investment in their Default SIP (main SIP for CMP schemes) and their current (default) asset allocations in their annual Chair鈥檚 Statement.

Requiring schemes to disclose this information directly to members and employers through their Chair鈥檚 Statement and Default / main SIP will result in members and employers being provided the extra information they need to understand how their pension is being invested, the impact these decisions could have on their retirement outcomes and that their trustees are giving consideration to the full range of investment opportunities on offer. This requirement also allows for greater transparency and standardisation of reporting across the DC market, allowing trustees to make more informed investment decisions and employers to better compare the value between DC schemes when choosing where to automatically enrol their employees.

Policy Option 2: Mandating investment in illiquid assets

Some industry stakeholders have advocated for government to adopt a stronger position on exploration of illiquid assets. They cite 鈥渃omply or explain鈥� 鈥� requiring pension schemes to allocate a certain percentage of total assets towards private markets or explain to regulators why they choose not to 鈥� as the approach they believe should be implemented. Any attempt to force private pension schemes to invest in specific asset classes or sectors may result in a market distortion, lead to poorer returns for DC scheme members and cut across both the fiduciary duty to which trustees must adhere and the independence of pension scheme trustees from government policy objectives. By requiring disclosure of investment policies and asset allocations without mandating specific allocations, we can encourage greater transparency, diversification and competition across industry without having to intervene in independent investment decisions that should only be taken by trustees.

Policy Option 3 and 4: Alternative to legislations 鈥� Guidance only

As an alternative to legislation, DWP could either:

1. Produce non-statutory guidance recommending that trustees voluntarily provide this information to their members and employers, as at least 4 percent of schemes already do, or

2. Ask that The Pensions Regulator (TPR) provides updated guidance to trustees including that they should voluntarily publicly disclose their policies on illiquid investment and their default asset allocations. This would be subject to TPR agreement.

Experience has shown that unless a duty is contained in legislation, with consequential actions for non-compliance, a certain degree of non-compliance exists in adhering to non-regulatory measures and could lead to inconsistency in approaches and coverage giving employers and members an incomplete picture^{[footnote 8]}. This therefore indicates that further action is required.

Preferred option: Summary of assessment of impact on business and other main affected groups

Impact on Business

Amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations As a result of the amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations, the relevant schemes in scope (occupational DC trust schemes with 100 or more members, including hybrids) as well as amendments to Statement of Investment Principles for CMP schemes, henceforth 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥�, will be impacted in the following ways:

• One-off familiarisation cost to trustees of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to read and understand the change in regulations and accompanying guidance.
• One-off cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to produce an initial explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets.
• Ongoing cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to update their explanatory statement in their Default Statement of Investment Principles, or main SIP for CMP schemes, at least every three years.

Introducing new asset allocation disclosure regulations

As a result of the new asset allocation disclosure regulations, the relevant schemes in scope (occupational DC trust schemes with 100 or more members, including hybrids and CMP schemes), henceforth 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥�, will be impacted in the following ways:

• One-off familiarisation cost to trustees of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to read and understand the change in regulations and accompanying guidance.
• One-off cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to produce average asset allocation breakdowns and information in the Chair鈥檚 Statement.
• Ongoing cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� to update their average asset allocation breakdowns and information in their Chair鈥檚 Statement annually.

Impact on Regulators

The Pensions Regulator (TPR) is responsible for monitoring compliance with existing Statement of Investment Principles regulations and will be responsible for monitoring compliance with new asset allocation disclosure regulations. TPR will be impacted in the following ways:

• One-off set up cost for TPR to read and understand updated and new regulations and update their guidance to trustees.
• Ongoing cost to monitor compliance with regulations and identify non-compliance and take enforcement action where necessary.

Impact on Members and Employers

As a result of the regulations, members and employers of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� will be impacted in the following ways:

• Members and employers will benefit from an increase in the information they receive on how their and their employees鈥� pension fund is invested.
• Any changes in asset allocations by 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� as a result of developing a new policy on illiquid assets may potentially increase diversification of assets and greater returns on investment for members. However, this is not a direct result of policy proposals. This is dependent on schemes taking action and changing their investment policies, in response to proposals.

Signed-off by	Date
Departmental Policy signoff (SCS): Jo Gibson	16/06/2022
Economist signoff (senior analyst): Andrew Ward	11/07/2022
Better Regulation Unit signoff: Prabhavati Mistry	18/08/2022

Additional detail 鈥� policy, analysis, and impacts

Policy options considered, including alternatives to regulation

Policy Option 0: Do Nothing

1. Currently, we estimate at least 4 percent of schemes in scope for asset allocation disclosures have voluntarily reported their asset allocations in the proposed format^{[footnote 9]}.

2. As disclosure is not currently uniform, it is difficult for employers to compare offerings across schemes, and for members to compare across the various pots they may hold. It is broadly agreed that employers and members should have the opportunity to better engage with their pension, understand how their money is invested and be aware of any pertinent information about their pensions.

3. Experience has shown that industry rarely complies with non-regulatory measures. If we do nothing, trustees will not be having the conversations needed to fully consider all investment opportunities available or understand the benefits and value that illiquid assets could bring to their portfolios.

Policy Option 1: Amend the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations and introduce new asset allocation disclosure regulations (Preferred Option)

4. This option involves requiring qualifying DC schemes to disclose and explain their policies on illiquid investment in their Default SIP (CMP schemes will report their policies on illiquid investment in the main SIP, because they don鈥檛 produce a Default SIP) and their current default asset allocations in their annual Chair鈥檚 Statement.

5. We believe all pension savers have the right to easily access this information, and if disclosed in a clear and consistent manner, this would improve their understanding of the concept of illiquid investment, and the potential risks and benefits it could bring to their overall savings. We are looking to develop a standardised and accessible disclosure requirement to encourage all schemes to regularly provide consistent, clear data to employers and members so they can understand where their pension is being invested and the value they are receiving.

6. Requiring schemes to provide this information directly to employers and members through their Chair鈥檚 Statements and Default / main SIPs will result in employers and members getting all the information they need without having to make individual requests. It also gives employers and members the certainty that their trustees are giving proper consideration to the full range of investment opportunities on offer.

7. This will not automatically increase investment in illiquid assets, but we expect it to further educate trustees, increase conversations around investment in productive finance, and potentially change the culture of DC investment towards focussing on overall value and returns to members, rather than just cost.

Policy Option 2: Mandating investment in illiquid assets

8. Some industry stakeholders have advocated for government to adopt a stronger position on exploration of illiquid assets. They cite 鈥渃omply or explain鈥� 鈥� requiring pension schemes to allocate a certain percentage of total assets towards private markets or explain to regulators why they choose not to 鈥� as the approach they believe should be implemented.

9. This pressure was referenced in the joint letter issued by the Chancellor and the Prime Minister calling for an 鈥業nvestment Big Bang鈥�^{[footnote 10]}. The letter acknowledges that 鈥渃hoosing which assets to invest in to secure the best outcomes remains a matter for pension fund trustees, and other custodians of institutional capital.鈥�

10. Any attempt to force private pension schemes to invest in specific asset classes or sectors may result in a market distortion, poorer returns for DC scheme members and would cut across the fiduciary duty to which trustees must adhere and the independence of pension scheme trustees from government policy objectives. By requiring disclosure of investment policies and asset allocations without mandating specific allocations, we can encourage greater transparency, diversification, and competition across industry without having to intervene in independent investment decisions that should only be taken by trustees.

Policy Option 3 and 4: Alternatives to legislation

11. As an alternative to legislation, DWP could either:

1) Produce non-statutory guidance recommending that trustees voluntarily provide this information to their members, as at least 4 percent of schemes already do, or

2) Ask that TPR provides updated guidance to trustees including that they should voluntarily publicly disclose their policies on illiquid investment and their default asset allocations. This would be subject to TPR agreement.

12. Experience has shown that unless a duty is contained in legislation, with consequential actions for non-compliance, a certain degree of non-compliance exists in adhering to non-regulatory measures and could lead to inconsistency in approaches and coverage giving employers and members an incomplete picture^{[footnote 11]}. This therefore indicates that further action is required.

Preferred Option 鈥� Amend the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations and introduce new asset allocation disclosure regulations

Evidence behind the rationale for intervention

13. Less liquid assets have the potential to offer members higher net returns in the long-term, especially within a diversified portfolio that balances risk with opportunity^{[footnote 12]}, ^{[footnote 13]}, ^{[footnote 14]}. They can also facilitate investment in key areas such as housing, infrastructure, environmental protection, and growth companies that lift the economy^{[footnote 15]}.

14. We are therefore proposing to require schemes to disclose their policy on investment in illiquid assets within their Default Statement of Investment Principles and publicly disclose their default asset allocation in their annual Chair鈥檚 Statement. We propose CMP schemes report their policies on illiquid investment in the main SIP, as they don鈥檛 produce a Default SIP.

15. We are not requiring trustees or investment managers to change their asset allocation as a result of new regulatory requirements, but rather to reflect on the decisions they have already made, and the decisions they will make, as part of their ongoing fiduciary duty to create an investment approach that works for members.

16. Low risk, passive investment in index trackers and other low-cost assets has led to good, stable returns for DC schemes for at least a decade^{[footnote 16]} but this will not necessarily continue into the future^{[footnote 17]}. We believe these policy proposals find a good balance between protecting trustees鈥� fiduciary duty whilst encouraging trustees to have more focussed discussions about assets that could bring better retirement outcomes to members as well as benefits to innovative sectors of the UK economy, regardless of their cost.

17. These measures also seek to encourage greater competition and innovation based on overall value for money in the DC market. If asset allocation becomes a standardised disclosure across industry, members, employers and investment consultants could compare a scheme鈥檚 allocation alongside other key metrics, including net investment returns, costs and charges, and quality of service to make sure they are getting the best value possible.

Costs to businesses of preferred option

Counterfactual

18. The counterfactual is the 鈥渄o nothing鈥� option. The counterfactual assumes that no schemes are currently including their policy on illiquid asset investment in their Default Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) or the proposed format of asset allocation breakdowns in their Annual Chair鈥檚 Statement.

19. Given the large number of schemes in scope of both measures, it is considered disproportionate to check the Chair鈥檚 Statement and Default Statement of Investment Principles of each scheme to confirm this counterfactual. We expect the counterfactual holds for the majority of schemes in scope based on our review of available information from the largest occupational DC trust pension schemes.

20. The size of impacts to business will vary from scheme to scheme. The impact will depend on factors including the investment consultancy used by each scheme, any potential economies of scale and the extent of changes required compared to scheme鈥檚 current practices.

21. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope of Default SIP illiquid statement policy proposals who already have an illiquid asset investment policy may experience lower costs from the new regulations, relative to schemes without an existing policy on illiquid asset investment.

22. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope of asset allocation disclosure policy proposals who already disclose their asset allocations in industry publications^{[footnote 18]} may experience lower costs from the new regulations relative to schemes who do not already disclose this information.

Costs to Pension Schemes in Scope

23. For the amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles regulations and the new average asset allocation disclosure regulations, the 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope are Occupational DC pension schemes including hybrids with 100 or more members.

24. We estimate there are around 700 schemes^{[footnote 19]} in scope of both measures, based on TPR data.

Familiarisation Cost

25. Only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� directly affected will be expected to familiarise themselves with the new regulations and guidance from TPR.

26. There will be a one-off cost to all 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� trustees to familiarise themselves with the proposed regulations and guidance. A pension scheme in scope will experience this one-off cost in the first year only.

27. We estimate that schemes in scope have approximately 3 trustees per scheme^{[footnote 20]}, with an estimated average hourly cost (including overheads) of around 拢29 per hour^{[footnote 21]}.

28. We estimate there are around 700 relevant schemes^{[footnote 22]} in scope of the Default SIP amendment and new average asset allocation disclosure regulations and therefore facing a familiarisation cost.

29. We estimate it would take trustees of schemes in scope approximately 1.6 hours to read and understand the regulations and guidance. We have assumed the regulations are 8 pages, guidance from TPR is 1 page and guidance from DWP is 7 pages. We have assumed it would take 6 minutes to read each page^{[footnote 23]}.

Default SIP Illiquid Statement familiarisation cost

Amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles Regulations

30. The costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope resulting from this policy proposal are divided into:

• The costs of producing the explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets
• The cost of updating the Default Statement of Investment Principles, or Statement of Investment Principles for CMP schemes, with new information every three years

Producing Explanatory Statement Cost

31. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope will face the cost of producing an explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets.

32. Pension schemes in scope will experience a one-off cost of producing the initial version of this statement in the first year only.

33. This cost will involve the additional time spent by 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope on creating and agreeing their policy on illiquid investment and the setting of trustee beliefs on illiquids.

34. Based on consultation responses, our estimate of aggregate costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope is 拢5,000 in year one only.

35. Some consultation responses outlined there may be additional one-off costs for training on illiquids for trustees. However, we consider this to be included in trustees鈥� fiduciary duty and therefore have not included in our costs to business.

36. Some consultation responses also outlined there may be additional one-off costs for schemes to seek legal advice on their illiquid investment policy and consulting fees associated with advice on incorporating illiquid assets. However, this is optional and not required by the regulations. Therefore, we have not included this within our costs to business.

Updating Explanatory Statement Cost

37. There will be an ongoing cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope to update their explanatory statement at least every three years, in line with the Statement of Investment Principles reporting requirements.

38. This cost will involve the additional time spent by 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope discussing updating their policy, production of an updated explanatory statement in their Default / main SIP and the time spent aligning format with other member communications.

39. Based on consultation responses, our estimate of aggregate costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes in scope鈥� is 拢1,000 every three years.

Asset Allocation Disclosure Regulations

40. The costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope resulting from this policy proposal are divided into:

• The costs of producing asset allocation information and breakdowns
• The cost of updating the Chair鈥檚 Statement with new asset allocation information and breakdowns annually

Producing Asset Allocations Cost

41. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope will face the cost of collating the necessary data, producing the requested asset allocation breakdowns and accompanying explanatory text, in line with the asset allocation disclosure requirements.

42. Pension schemes in scope will experience this cost in the first year only.

43. This cost will involve the additional time 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope spend on engagement with asset managers, obtaining and validating the required information and data and preparing it in the correct format with accompanying text.

44. Based on consultation responses, our estimate of the aggregate costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope is 拢5,000 in year one only.

45. 26 pension schemes in scope of this proposal disclosed information on their asset allocations in Corporate Adviser鈥檚 Master Trusts & GPP鈥檚 Defaults Report 2022^{[footnote 24]}. Therefore, we have assumed these 26 schemes will only face a cost from preparing the data in the correct format with accompanying text in year one. This represents 4 percent of total schemes in scope of the proposal.

46. Based on consultation responses, our estimate of the aggregate costs to these 26 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope is 拢1,000 in year one only. This estimate is based on our estimate for ongoing costs discussed in the following section.

Note for above equation: Around 680^{[footnote 25]} schemes in scope

47. Some consultation responses outlined there may be additional one-off legal costs to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope as they may wish to seek advice from their legal teams in the first year of the policy to ensure they are fulfilling the regulatory requirements. However, this is not required by the regulations. Therefore, we have not included this within our costs to business.

Updating Asset Allocations Cost

48. There will be an ongoing cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope to update the asset allocation breakdowns and explanatory text every year, in line with the asset allocation disclosure requirements.

49. This cost will involve the time 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope spend every year updating their data on asset allocations, validating it, updating their breakdowns and explanatory text in the Chair鈥檚 Statement which is published on scheme鈥檚 websites. This cost will be an equal undertaking for schemes who have previously published asset allocation information and schemes who have not.

50. Based on consultation responses, our estimate of the aggregate cost to 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope is 拢1,000 each year.

Non-monetised impacts to business

Member communication costs

51. The additional information on illiquid asset investment and asset allocations in relevant schemes鈥� Default / main Statement of Investment Principles and Chair鈥檚 Statements may result in an increase in member queries.

52. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope may experience an increase in costs to respond to increased member queries as a result of the proposed regulations.

53. This cost is indirect and not quantifiable as it relies on the responses of members of the 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope.

Costs to Regulator

54. The Pensions Regulator (TPR) will be responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the requirements. We have engaged with TPR to estimate the cost and impact on them of these measures.

Set-up costs

55. There will be a one-off cost to TPR to familiarise themselves with the proposed regulations, understand the impacts on their duties and implement required changes.

56. Engagement with TPR suggests that set-up costs will be negligible.

Monitoring and enforcement costs

57. TPR compliance and enforcement is currently subject to a working group. Therefore, TPR are currently unable to confirm plans or provide full estimates on the impact. We will continue to work with TPR during this process to obtain robust estimates when available.

Amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles Regulations

58. TPR expect to monitor compliance with the amendment to the Default Statement of Investment principles regulations via the scheme return or by checking the Default SIP document on the relevant scheme鈥檚 website.

59. TPR are currently unable to provide cost estimates for monitoring and enforcement.

Asset Allocation Disclosure Regulations

60. TPR expect to monitor compliance with the asset allocation disclosure regulations via the Chair鈥檚 Statement. Figures below are calculated based on monitoring and enforcement costs for Master Trusts in scope of the proposed regulations and a small number of non-Master Trust schemes in scope, whose Chair鈥檚 Statements TPR may review.

61. TPR will experience one-off legal and policy costs in the first year only. This cost will involve the policy input associated with amendments to the compliance process and changes to TPR鈥檚 guidance. The one-off cost also involves legal costs associated with initial roll-out of new review questions, training costs, updating guidance and external communications.

62. Table 1 sets out the estimated one-off costs provided by TPR for monitoring and enforcing compliance with asset allocation disclosure regulations.

Table 1: Estimated one-off costs to TPR related to asset allocation disclosure regulations

Expenditure	Cost
Total one-off costs	拢2,000[footnote 26]
Legal	拢1,250 - 拢1,500
Policy	拢180

Source: The Pensions Regulator, unpublished data

63. TPR will experience ongoing regulatory and legal costs. This cost will involve additional time spent by regulatory transactions teams conducting reviews of Chair鈥檚 Statements and the additional time spent by legal teams on these reviews.

64. Table 2 sets out the estimated ongoing costs provided by TPR for monitoring and enforcing compliance with asset allocation disclosure regulations.

Table 2: Estimated ongoing costs to TPR related to asset allocation disclosure regulations

Expenditure	Cost
Total ongoing costs	拢8,000[footnote 27]
Regulatory Transactions	拢6,800
Legal	拢700

Source: The Pensions Regulator, unpublished data

Impacts to Members and Employers

65. It is not possible to quantify the impacts to members and employers as a result of regulations as the potential costs and benefits described below are indirect and reliant on the actions of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope.

66. Members of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope could benefit from the introduction of these regulations, specifically those presently in pension schemes that do not have an established policy on investment in illiquid assets or publicly report their asset allocations.

67. A key benefit for members and employers of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� is access to more information about how their or their employees鈥� pension fund is invested. This could result in increased member and employer engagement with pensions.

68. An additional benefit for members of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� is the potential for improved outcomes for their pension savings. If 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope have not previously considered investment in illiquid assets before being required to develop an explanatory statement, they may now choose to invest in these types of assets which have the potential to give members higher returns. In addition, if pension schemes decide to commence investing in illiquid assets, there may be benefits to members in lower risk from greater diversification of their pension portfolios.

69. Three consultation responses outlined the risk of additional costs to business as a result of the proposed regulations being passed onto members of 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope. However, no schemes in scope of the requirements raised the risk of additional costs to business being passed to members.

Wider economic and societal impacts

70. A wider, indirect benefit of the disclosure of illiquid policies could be the potential for an increased share of assets being invested in illiquid assets. This could mean that sectors of the economy such as smaller innovative firms, housing, infrastructure, and green infrastructure receive more investment than prior to the regulations, which could have wide ranging impacts across society.

Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks

Risks

Counterfactual

71. The costs are highly dependent on the counterfactual which will vary between schemes.

72. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope of Default SIP illiquid policy proposals who already have an established policy on investment in illiquid assets may experience lower costs from new regulations, relative to schemes without a current policy on illiquids.

73. 鈥楻elevant schemes鈥� in scope of asset allocation disclosure proposals who already report their asset allocations publicly may experience lower costs from new regulations, relative to schemes who do not currently report this information.

Monitoring and Enforcement

74. Compliance and enforcement plans are currently subject to a TPR working group. Therefore, TPR are unable to provide confirmed monitoring and enforcement plans for both measures and estimates they have provided may be subject to change.

Sensitivity Analysis

Familiarisation

75. We assume it will take approximately 3 trustees per scheme in scope 1.6 hours to familiarise themselves with the regulations in the first year only. When allowing for sensitivity around the time assumption of 50 per cent (i.e., 15 or 45 minutes) holding everything else constant, the familiarisation cost decreases to 拢55,000 and increases to 拢164,000.

Pension schemes in scope 鈥� Amendment to the Default Statement of Investment Principles Regulations

Producing explanatory statement

76. The upper limit cost per scheme of producing an explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets is assumed to be 拢7,500 based on an increase of 50 per cent. The lower limit is 拢1,000 based on the ranges provided by the pension industry鈥檚 responses to DWP鈥檚 consultation. When allowing for sensitivity around the cost assumption based on these upper and lower limits holding everything else constant, the one-off cost decreases to 拢710,000 and increases to 拢5,325,000.

Updating explanatory statement

77. The upper limit cost per scheme of updating an explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets is assumed to be 拢1,500 based on an increase of 50 per cent. The lower limit is 拢500 based on the ranges provided by the pension industry鈥檚 responses to DWP鈥檚 consultation. When allowing for sensitivity around the cost assumption based on these upper and lower limits holding everything else constant, the ongoing cost decreases to 拢355,000 and increases to 拢1,065,000.

Pension schemes in scope 鈥� Asset Allocation Disclosure Regulations

Producing asset allocation breakdowns and information

78. The upper limit cost per scheme of producing an initial asset allocation breakdown in year one and accompanying text is assumed to be 拢7,500 for schemes not already disclosing and 拢1,500 for schemes already disclosing based on an increase of 50 per cent. The lower limit is 拢1,000 for schemes not already disclosing and 拢500 for schemes already disclosing based on the ranges provided by the pension industry鈥檚 responses to DWP鈥檚 consultation. When allowing for sensitivity around the cost assumption based on these upper and lower limits holding everything else constant, the one-off cost decreases to 拢697,000 and increases to 拢5,169,000.

Updating asset allocation breakdowns and information

79. The upper limit cost per scheme of updating asset allocation breakdown and accompanying text each year is assumed to be 拢1,500 based on an increase of 50 per cent. The lower limit is 拢500 based on the ranges provided by the pension industry鈥檚 responses to DWP鈥檚 consultation. When allowing for sensitivity around the cost assumption based on these upper and lower limits holding everything else constant, the ongoing cost decreases to 拢355,000 and increases to 拢1,065,000.

Assumptions

Assumptions for schemes鈥� familiarisation

80. We have assumed only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope of the amendment to the Default SIP regulations and new asset allocation disclosure regulations will need to familiarise themselves. For CMP schemes, only those which are used to satisfy automatic enrolment obligations (鈥渜ualifying collective money purchase schemes鈥�) will need to familiarise themselves. We estimate there are around 700 schemes^{[footnote 28]} who will be affected.

81. We have assumed an average cost of time for a Trustee is around 拢29 per hour. This is based on the 2021 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data for Corporate Managers and Directors. The median hourly gross pay for corporate managers and directors is around 拢23^{[footnote 29]}. This is uplifted by 27% for overheads from the previous version of the Green Book, no updated estimate is available.

82. We have assumed an average of approximately 3 trustees per scheme, for schemes in scope with 100 or more members. This is based on a weighted average using TPR data on 鈥楴umber of Trustees 鈥� by scheme size鈥�^{[footnote 30]}.

83. For familiarisation costs we have assumed a reading time of 6 minutes per page for Trustees. This assumes that an average adult鈥檚 reading speed is 1 minute to read 100 words and there are 600 words to a page, giving 6 minutes to read a page.

84. We have assumed regulations will be 8 pages and guidance will be 8 pages.

Amendment of Default Statement of Investment Principles Regulations

Assumptions for producing explanatory statement costs

85. We have assumed only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope of the regulations will need to produce an explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets.

86. This evidence was gathered via the consultation. We have assumed providers will experience these costs in the first year only.

Assumptions for updating explanatory statement costs

87. We have assumed only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� in scope of the regulations will need to update their explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets in their Default Statement of Investment Principles, or Statement of Investment Principles for CMP schemes.

88. This evidence was gathered via the consultation. We have assumed providers will experience these costs every three years, as this is the minimum frequency which schemes are required to update their Default / main SIP.

Asset Allocation Disclosure Regulations

Assumptions for producing asset allocation costs

89. We have assumed only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� within the scope of regulations will need to produce asset allocation breakdowns and accompanying text.

90. We have assumed 26 pension schemes in scope of this measure already have access to the required data and information in the appropriate format, given their inclusion in Corporate Advisor鈥檚 Master Trusts & GPP鈥檚 Defaults Report 2022^{[footnote 31]}.

91. This evidence was gathered via the consultation. We have assumed providers will experience this cost in the first year only.

Assumptions for updating asset allocation costs

92. We have assumed only 鈥榬elevant schemes鈥� within the scope of regulations will need to update their asset allocation breakdowns and accompanying text in their Chair鈥檚 Statement.

93. This evidence was gathered via the consultation. We have assumed providers will experience this cost every year.

Impact on Small and Micro Businesses

94. Information on pension schemes by number of employees is not available. Therefore, we have used scheme size (number of members) as a proxy when considering impacts on small and micro businesses.

95. Only pension schemes with 100 or more members will be required to produce an explanatory statement on their policy towards investment in illiquid assets for their Default Statement of Investment Principles and disclose their asset allocations. Therefore, we do not expect small and micro pension schemes to be impacted by this measure.

96. Many small and micro businesses use large pension schemes to fulfil their automatic enrolment duties. Therefore, their employees may benefit from the proposed regulations in the manner discussed in the 鈥業mpact on Members鈥� section.

Monitoring and Evaluation

97. The Pensions Regulator (TPR) will be responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the requirements.

98. DWP will work closely and continuously with TPR and industry stakeholders to understand and review the post-implementation impact of these policies and ensure they continue to fulfil our policy intent with minimum burden to trustees.

99. We propose to conduct a review of the regulations and guidance, informed by evidence received from industry stakeholders and TPR, to be published within three years of these regulations and guidance coming into force.

100. Although the regulations are planned (subject to Parliamentary time/approval) to come into effect in 2023, there will be transition period between this date and when schemes will be required to action the asset allocation disclosure requirements in their chair鈥檚 statement and the illiquid investment policy disclosure requirements in their Default Statement of Investment Principles, or Statement of Investment Principles for CMP schemes. We therefore propose to conduct a review of the real-world impacts of these policies within three years give enough time for collection of sufficient evidence of the impact and allow for familiarisation of the policies by schemes after at least two disclosures.

Summary of Impacts^{[footnote 32]}

Summary of Impacts per scheme

Type of Cost	Year One	Year Two	Year Three	Year Four and Onwards	Frequency	Assumptions and Rationale
One-off costs 鈥� Familiarisation	拢200[footnote 33]	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Assumed all trustees of a scheme in scope are required to familiarise and understand the requirements.
One-off costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations production costs	5,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
Ongoing costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations updates	拢0	拢0	拢0	拢1,000	Every three years, or without delay following any significant change in investment policy	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
One-off costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations production	Schemes already reporting: 拢1,000 Schemes not already reporting: 拢5,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
Ongoing costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations updates	拢0	拢1,000	拢1,000	拢1,000	Yearly within the Chair鈥檚 Statement	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
Total Costs	Schemes: 拢6,000-拢10,000	拢1,000	拢1,000	拢1,000 in Years Five, Six, Eight and Nine and 拢2,000 in Years Four, Seven and Ten.	听	听

Summary of Impacts 鈥� totals

Type of Cost	Year One	Year Two	Year Three	Year Four and Onwards	Frequency	Assumptions and Rationale
One-off costs 鈥揊amiliarisation	拢109,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Assumed all trustees of a scheme in scope are required to familiarise and understand the requirements.
One-off costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations production costs	3,550,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
One-off costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations TPR cost	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available
Ongoing costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations updates	拢0	拢0	拢0	拢710,000[footnote 34]	Every three years, or without delay following any significant change in investment policy	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
Ongoing costs 鈥� Amendment to Default SIP regulations TPR cost	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	Not currently available	听
One-off costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations production	拢3,446,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once per scheme	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
One-off costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations TPR cost	拢2,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once	Costs from The Pensions Regulator.
Ongoing costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations updates	拢0	拢710,000	拢710,000	拢710,000	Yearly within the Chair鈥檚 Statement	Costs from the pensions industry responses to DWP consultation.
Ongoing costs 鈥� Asset Allocation disclosure regulations TPR cost	拢8,000	拢8,000	拢8,000	拢8,000	Yearly	Costs from The Pensions Regulator.
Total Costs	Schemes: 拢6,996,000 - TPR 拢10,000	拢710,000 - TPR 拢8,000	拢710,000 - TPR 拢8,000	拢710,000 in years five, six eight and nine, 拢1,420,000 in years four, seven and ten -TPR 拢8,000 in Years Four to Ten.	听	听