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This guidance sets out considerations for caseworkers as to the interpretation of the Category 4 in relation to UKSF Afghan Partner Forces cases.

Category 4 wording

The wording in the Immigration Rules is as follows:

‘ARAP 3.6. A person meets the eligibility requirement if conditions 1 and 2 and one or both of conditions 3 and 4 applies. Further detail published at ÌìÃÀÓ°Ôº.

Condition 1 is that at any time on or after 1 October 2001, the person:

• (i) was directly employed in Afghanistan by a UK Government department; or
• (ii) provided goods or services in Afghanistan under contract to a UK Government department (whether as, or on behalf of, a party to the contract); or
• (iii) worked in Afghanistan alongside a UK Government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting that department.

Condition 2 is that the person, in the course of the employment or work or the provision of those services under Condition 1, made a substantive and positive contribution towards the achievement of one or more of the following:

• (i) the UK Government’s military objectives with respect to Afghanistan; or
• (ii) the UK Government’s national security objectives with respect to Afghanistan (and for these purposes, the UK government’s national security objectives include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption objectives).

Condition 3 is that because of the person’s employment or work or those services under Condition 1, the person:

• (i) is or was at an elevated risk of targeted attacks; and
• (ii) is or was at high risk of death or serious injury.

Condition 4 is that the person holds information the disclosure of which would give rise to or aggravate a specific threat to a UK Government Department or its interests.’

Condition 1

In relation to the UKSF Partner Forces, the aspect of condition 1 that is most likely to apply is condition 1 (iii).

Caseworkers should take the following approach when assessing an individual for condition 1 (iii).

Definite confirmation

• Appears in data check of UKSF systems [and liaising as required in respect of specified dates].
• Positively identified by a UKSF unit representative [and liaising as required in respect of specified dates].

Other evidence to consider

• Evidence of ID card for the Triples/base access with clearly identifiable photo.
• Photograph in uniform (or clearly identifiable military location) with either Triples insignia or identifiable relevant UKSF or [other] personnel/equipment.

Other ways to evidence condition 1 that could be adopted

• Contacting named individuals in the application who could vouch for the applicant including former UKSF or non-UKSF personnel.
• Assessment of the written evidence in the application e.g. does it portray a credible description of activity that would have been conducted by the Afghan Partner Force the individual purports to have been in and undertaken in partnership with HM Forces including UKSF?
• If there is uncertainty around eligibility then the Digital Archive Service (DAS) could be used to check records that may provide a determination for CF 333 and ATF 444 and possibly other Afghan Partner Forces.

Timeframe Parameters

For UKSF Partner Force cases: there are distinct timeframes for each Partner Force that will also determine whether condition 1 (iii) is likely to be met, in particular:

• [Between specified dates], UKSF provided assistance to establish and develop CF 333. Up to 2014, UKSF maintained a capacity building relationship with Commando Force 333 (CF 333) supporting GIRoA, NATO and UK’s strategy. Therefore cases in this time period should be referred to [others] and in cases of timeframe overlap, consultation should occur between UKSF and [others] to ensure a complete assessment of activity. Post 2014 - 21 the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility occurred and the presence was a Special Operations Advisory Team (SOAT) to mentor and advise CF333. Therefore post 2014 it is less likely that members of CF333 met condition 1 by working alongside a UK Government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting that department because it was the SOAT who was supporting CF333 by providing training, mentoring and advice to Afghan-led operations, not the other way round.
• [Between specified dates], UKSF developed a capacity-building relationship with Afghan Task Force 444 (ATF 444) where they supported GIRoA, NATO and UK’s strategy until the withdrawal of UK forces from Helmand province. Their initial focus was on ‘find, feel, understand’ activities to help provide, in particular, Task Force Helmand with ‘ground truth’ of what was going on in Helmand. In [specified date] the ATF was handed over to other NATO Allies who continued the relationship, and therefore after this time it is less likely that condition 1 (iii) will be met.
• [Between specified dates], UKSF developed a capacity building relationship with an element of [another specified] department. This was the [department’s unit] who worked directly with UKSF [to deliver HMG] objectives in Afghanistan. The majority of those serving in this [unit] will have already been relocated under ARAP. […]
• From [between specified dates] UKSF maintained a capacity building relationship with a provincial […] unit [named]. In [a specified date] the relationship was handed over to other NATO Allies who continued the relationship, and therefore after this time condition 1 (iii) will not be met.

If there is either definite confirmation or, to the satisfaction of the caseworker, which is on the balance of probabilities, sufficient other evidence, within the relevant timeframe for the respective Partner Force, then condition 1 (iii) is met.

Condition 2 - context

Pre-2014

National Security Objectives

As set out in Nick Gurr’s witness statement on CX1 and Ors, ‘the primary objective when the UK deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 was to ensure that it could not be used as a base for international terrorism in the wake of the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks, after Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.’

This is supported, for example, by public statements as can be found in the National Archives’ ‘Operations in Afghanistan: Why we are there’ which states ‘The Taliban gave safe haven to Al-Qaeda, which allowed terrorists to plan and carry out terrorist attacks around the world, including the atrocities of 11 September 2001. That is why the UN authorised a NATO-led military intervention. British Forces are operating in Afghanistan as part of that NATO intervention to prevent Afghan territory from again being used by Al-Qaeda as a base from which to plan attacks on the UK and our allies.’

Following the Bonn Agreement (ratified in 2001), the UK took on lead responsibility for counter narcotics. The role of CF 333 was key to undertaking high-level counter narcotic interdiction operations.

Military Objectives

UNSCR 1386 established the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) under a Chapter VII mandate where ISAF was established ‘to assist the Afghan Interim Authority; calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources’.

Prior to 2006 UK forces under ISAF were centred in Kabul and then Mazar-e-Sharif before, in 2006, deploying to Helmand alongside other ISAF countries (notably by the Danes and Estonians and, from 2008, the US (Marines)) as part of the expansion of ISAF forces. As Nick Gurr’s witness statement covers ‘ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the Afghan Government to provide effective security for its population’. This was because as acknowledged in ‘Operations in Afghanistan: Why we are there’ ‘Afghanistan is not yet strong enough to look after its own security. The presence of NATO forces is preventing Al-Qaeda or the Taliban regime from returning, while the UK and other NATO forces train Afghanistan’s security forces to take over the task’.

The above is further illustrated in the 2006 CDS Directive for Operation HERRICK HMG Security Outcomes. The security line is the primary military focus, and this has 2 key outcomes:

• A security environment that meets the security needs of the Afghan population, allows necessary activities by the UK, International Community, GoA, and Non Government Organisations (NGOs) to take place, and allows the staged expansion of GoA influence and authority across the country.
• Sufficient, sustainable indigenous capacity, holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and under legally accountable civilian leadership, to assure a stable and secure Afghanistan that is able to meet internal and external threats whilst presenting no threat to its neighbours and the International Community.

Post 2014

In 2014, the Afghan National and Defence Security Forces (ANDSF) took on the full responsibility for security across Afghanistan in a process known as the Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility. NATO - and the UK - remained in Afghanistan under NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, or in UK parlance, Op TORAL (and the UKSF part of that […])  As set out in the 2014 Op TORAL Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Directive, ‘HMG’s headline goal in Afghanistan remains protecting UK national security both by directly addressing threats (terrorism, drugs, migration) and indirectly by supporting a stable, well governed state on the road to self-reliance. This will be achieved by:

• Countering direct threats to the UK by building greater Afghan Counter Terrorism and Counter Narcotics capability.
• Promoting Afghan stability and security by supporting the ANDSF and the rule of law, and encouraging a peace process and regional stability’.

Apart from the UK’s provision of the Kabul Security Force, this was solely a training and advisory mission which saw, for example, UK forces take the lead for establishing the Afghan National Army Officer Academy.

Types of Military Operation

[GIST: Detail provided of categories of ANSF Partnering operations, including reference to relevant features such as the nature of the operation, the proficiency of the Afghan Partner Unit (APU) involved, and the owners of the responsibility for (variously) conceiving, planning, leading and conducting operations.]

[GIST: Details provided of required ratios of APU to non-APU members involved in each operation type:

• Partnered Operations – Where the ISAF SOF have a significantly greater number of elements than the APU
• Enabled Operations - Where APU participation would be greater than any ISAF SOF supporting element
• Advised Operations - Where the APU have a significantly greater number of elements than the ISAF SOF]

Condition 2 Related to UKSF Partner Forces - Application

In terms of applying the above context to UKSF Partner Force cases, the following should guide caseworker decisions:

Solely being trained by and/or partnered with UK forces operating under an ISAF mandate (and UN-authorised mission) to enable Afghanistan to become capable enough to provide its own security does not equate to meeting condition 2. This activity was conducted by UK (and other ISAF) forces principally for the benefit of Afghanistan so it could look after its own security.

However, UKSF Partner Forces had roles of the highest impact and importance, both in relation to Afghanistan itself and the UK’s military and national security objectives in Afghanistan. To be considered against condition 2 an applicant will have already been assessed to meet condition 1, namely, membership of a UKSF Partner Force.

In assessing a positive and substantive contribution caseworkers could consider:

• The longevity of service. Anything less than 1 year may not easily demonstrate a substantive contribution.
• Role (see below).
• Seniority (see below).

The types of activity as a member of a UKSF Partner Force that would be likely to demonstrate a positive and substantive contribution to the UK’s national security or military objectives in condition 2 could include:

• Involvement in UK operational activity to combat international terrorism (e.g. Al-Qaeda and Islamic State) threatening the UK’s national security.
• Undertaking partnered or enabled military operations (where the force ratio was 50% or greater UK forces or UK-led) to conduct surveillance or High Value Targeting of Taliban senior leaders or other terrorist network senior leaders, countering Taliban IED networks or high-level counter narcotics operations, or providing niche support to Commander Task Force Helmand through ‘find, feel and understand’ activity. Post-2014, CF333 operations would not have been partnered or enabled (UK force ratio of 50% or greater) they would have at best been advised (UK comprised 25% or less of the force) and Afghan-led and therefore less likely to meet condition 1.
• Providing key, enabling activity to UK (i.e. ISAF) UKSF Partner Forces, without which partnered operations would likely fail. This includes:
  • the senior-most leadership of UKSF Partner Forces at the operational level (e.g. Commander and Deputy Commander equivalent) that enabled the [UKSF] Partner Force to undertake Partnered Operations.

Caseworkers should note that the above examples are not prescriptive or exhaustive.

In meeting condition 2, there will be evidence from either UK records or their UK partner unit, or in their application (photographic, written or support from a current or former member of the UK Armed Forces in a position to verify the individual and their activity) that demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the caseworker (i.e. on the balance of probabilities), the applicant was involved in partnered operations with a relevant UK partner unit.