ÌìÃÀÓ°Ôº

Letter from E3 (UK, France, Germany) foreign ministers

8 August 2025

Excellency,

The UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015), endorsing the JCPoA and seizing the UN Security Council of the Iranian nuclear issue, is set to expire on 18 October 2025.

Yet, the international community faces serious ongoing concerns regarding the lack of assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

E3’s commitment to diplomacy

Throughout more than twenty years of diplomatic efforts, the E3 have been unified in their objective: Iran shall never seek, acquire or develop a nuclear weapon, and a negotiated solution providing credible assurances to that end should be achieved through diplomatic efforts.

The E3 spent years contributing to this objective and negotiating with Iran to address the .international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. These diplomatic efforts, coordinated with those of our close partners, led to the adoption of the initial Joint Plan of Action in 2013 and subsequently the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015, and to UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015).

Ever since, and in spite of Iran’s nuclear escalation, the E3 have continuously complied with our commitments stemming from both the JCPoA and UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015).

In the wake of the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPoA on 8 May 2018, and the regrettable decision by Iran to cease implementing its commitments under the JCPoA as of May 2019 ^{[footnote 1]}, the E3 remained committed participants to the deal, and attempted to bring back all relevant stakeholders into compliance over several months of negotiation in 2021-2022.

These attempts failed due to Iran’s refusal to agree the generous offers made at the time. Despite this, the E3 have continued to engage Iran as part of our efforts to find a peaceful resolution of this issue through diplomacy. We did not participate in the planning or execution of any military action against Iran.

Current E3 efforts to make diplomatic progress

Ten years after the JCPoA was signed, our commitment to diplomacy remains unwavering. E3 diplomatic efforts continue, as marked by the most ·recent meetings of E3 Foreign Ministers and the EU High Representative with their Iranian counterpart on 20 June in Geneva and of E3/EU Political Directors with Iranian Deputy Foreign Ministers on 25 July in Istanbul as part of a series of meetings.

Iran’s proliferation crisis cannot be removed from the UNSC’s agenda at a moment when the risks that Iran’s nuclear programme poses to international peace and security are not mitigated, and nuclear activities with no credible civilian justification are ongoing.

Iran has violated not only the near entirety of its JCPoA commitments but also its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran is not allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to take place. Recent statements by Iranian officials threatening to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons call into question Iran’s commitment to a peaceful nuclear programme.

Without a robust, durable, and verifiable agreement in place, we cannot let the relevant decisions of the UNSC and the applicable international architecture lapse.

Direct negotiations between Iran and the US must resume urgently. The E3 stand ready to support this process.

To this end, the E3 have offered Iran a limited extension of the relevant provisions of UNSCR 2231, in exchange for Iran resuming negotiations and addressing some of the international community’s most immediate concerns regarding· the transparency and extent of its nuclear programme. To date, the offer put forward by the E3 has remained unanswered by Iran.

Such an extension would be granted to provide additional time for negotiations with the aim of concluding a new agreement, while maintaining the possibility of resorting to the reestablishment of relevant sanctions against Iran to prevent nuclear proliferation.

E3’s unambiguous ability to resort to relevant provisions of UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015)

E3 have always committed to use all diplomatic tools at our disposal to ensure Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. We have made clear that if Iran is not willing to reach a diplomatic solution before the end of August 2025, or does not seize the opportunity of an extension, E3 are prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism.

Despite unfounded claims to the contrary, the E3, as JCPoA participants, would be clearly and unambiguously legally justified in using relevant provisions of UNSCR 2231 (2015) to trigger UN snapback to reinstate UNSC resolutions against Iran which would prohibit enrichment and re-impose UN sanctions.

Iran’s Non-Performance of its JCPoA Commitments

Snapback can be triggered by the· E3, as JCPoA participants, because the relevant conditions under paragraph 11 of UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) are met. Iran’s actions as a JCPoA participant constitute a non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA.

Since 2019, Iran has willfully and publicly departed from its JCPoA commitments, as evidenced by more than 60 IAEA reports over 6 years. Iran’s non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA is as blatant as it is concerning.

Though not exhaustive, the list of nuclear commitments under the JCPoA that Iran has not met includes:

• stockpiles: Accumulating a total enriched uranium stockpile of 8400kg of UF6, representing more than 40 times the JCPoA limit, according to the IAEA DG’s most recent report issued on 31 May 2025 (GOV/2025/24). This includes more than 400kg of uranium enriched at 60%, which remains unaccounted for. Altogether, Iran vastly exceeds the maximum allowed uranium stockpile of 300kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6, and therefore clearly violates paragraph 56 and 57 of Annex I of the JCPoA
• enrichment levels: Enriching at levels up to 60%, drastically higher than the 3,67% limit set in paragraph 56 and 57 of Annex I of the JCPoA, which is unprecedented among states without nuclear weapons according to the IAEA DG’s report of31 May 2025 (GOV/2025/24)
• nuclear sites: Producing enriched material at sites prohibited by the JCPoA, such as Fordow, and announcing the opening of yet another enrichment site on 12 June 2025, in contravention of paragraph 45 of Annex I to the JCPoA
• advanced centrifuges: Producing, installing and operating thousands of new advanced centrifuges, which are prohibited under the JCPoA
• transparency and verification: Almost entirely rolling back JCPoA verification and monitoring commitments, including by ceasing implementation of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, in contravention to paragraphs 13 and 15 of the JCPoA, culminating in the Agency losing the continuity of knowledge on several parts of Iran’s programme and being unable to provide the assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme

While Iran’s nuclear programme has sustained significant damage, the fact of Iran’s continued nonperformance of its JCPoA commitments remains.

This all constitutes a clear legal basis for the E3 should we decide to notify the UNSC that Iran is in significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA and therefore to trigger the snapback mechanism pursuant to paragraph 11 of UNSC Resolution 2231(2015).

Use of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism

The E3 have consistently sought to resolve the issues arising from Iran’s noncompliance with its commitments.

This has included the use of the JCPoA’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, which was activated by the E3 on 14 January 2020, as confirmed by the JCPoA Coordinator in a statement on the same date, engaging in good faith efforts to exhaust this process and reach a diplomatic solution.

By contrast, Iran activated the Dispute Resolution Mechanism only in July 2020 as confirmed by the JCPoA Coordinator, more than a year after having ceased implementation of its commitments under the JCPoA. Any other purported recourse to this mechanism was never recognised by the JCPoA’s participants, neither at the time, nor today.

The Joint Commission was convened on multiple occasions, including at Ministerial level, and all possible efforts were made by E3 to resolve this dispute, far beyond the requisite period outlined in the JCPoA, and up until the relaunch of full formal negotiations on a deal to return Iran to full compliance withthe JCPoA, and the US to the deal, in 2021. After many months of negotiations, the JCPoA Coordinator tabled viable deals in March and again in August 2022. Much to our regret, Iran refused both packages.

Despite Iran’s non-performance, the E3 have continuously implemented the commitments stemming from both the JCPoA and UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015) in good faith.

E3 maintained sanctions lifting despite Iran’s systematic non-compliance, did not recourse to the snapback mechanism, and made extensive efforts through the establishment of INSTEX -an innovative trade mechanism to support trade with Iran -to realise the goals ofthe JCPoA.

Conclusion

Since 2019, the E3 have invested considerable energy and time, in good faith, in negotiations to resolve the issues arising from Iran’s non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA. We now face a situation in which, in addition to reneging on its JCPoA commitments, Iran has ceased cooperation with the IAEA, in violation of its CSA and NPT obligations. The Agency cannot provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme due to Iran’s actions, jeopardising international peace and security.

The E3 will uphold our responsibility as JCPoA participants and to the international community, by ensuring that continued appropriate consideration is given to Iran’s nuclear proliferation at the UNSC, and appropriate decisions are made.

The E3 remain fully committed to a diplomatic resolution to the crisis caused by Iran’s nuclear programme and will continue to engage with a view to reaching a negotiated solution. We are equally ready, and have unambiguous legal grounds, to notify the significant non-performance of JCPoA commitments by Iran as foreseen under UNSCR 2231 (2015), thereby triggering the snapback mechanism, should no satisfactory solution be reached by the end of August 2025.

---

Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs

David Lammy, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs

Johann Wadephul, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

---

• HE Mr Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations
• HE Mr Eloy Alfaro de Alba, President of the United Nations Security Council
• HE Madam Kaja Kallas, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the JCPoA Joint Commission
• Honorable members of the United Nations Security Council