Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools
Tests for 铿乶ancial constraints by experimentally allocating unconditional cash grants to schools in a village
Abstract
We test for 铿乶ancial constraints as a market failure in education in a low-income country by experimentally allocating unconditional cash grants to either one (L) or to all (H) private schools in a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments, accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, test scores and fees only increase in H along with higher teacher wages. This di铿erential impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity constraints and endogenous quality: greater 铿乶ancial saturation crowds-in quality investments. Higher social surplus in H, but greater private returns in L underscores the importance of leveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies.
This work is part of the Department for International Development鈥檚 鈥楻esearch on Improving Systems of Education鈥 (RISE) Programme
Citation
Andrabi, T.; Das, A.I.; Ozyurt, S.; Singh, N. (2018). Upping the Ante: The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools. RISE Working Paper 18/023
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